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AIDING AND ABETTING LIABILITY UNDER
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT SECTION 10(b)
AND SEC RULE 10b-5: THE INFUSION
OF A SLIDING-SCALE, FLEXIBLE-
FACTOR ANALYSIS
I. INTRODUCTION
In the area of securities law, the antifraud provisions of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 section 10(b)' and Securities and Exchange Com-
mission Rule lOb-5 2 have constituted about one-third of all securities ac-
tions brought.3 Plaintiffs have concentrated, not merely on the primary
1. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982) [hereinafter "sec-
tion 10(b)"]. Section 10(b) states that it is unlawful for any person:
To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.., any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
2. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988) [hereinafter "Rule lob-5"]. Rule lOb-5 states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any na-
tional securities exchange:
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with purchase or
sale of any security.
Id.
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not explicitly provide for a private right of action; how-
ever, the courts have inferred a civil cause of action. See, eg., Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800, 802-03 (E.D. Pa.), supplemented by, 83 F. Supp. 613 (E.D. Pa.
1947). The Supreme Court first acknowledged a civil right of action for section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 in Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
Recently, in Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), the Supreme Court
acknowledged that "a private right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 has
been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is
simply beyond peradventure." Id. at 380. See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976), where the Supreme Court stated that "the existence of a private cause of action for
violations of the statute and the Rule is now well established." Id. at 196. See Note, Liability
for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule 10b-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage
Actions, TEx. L. REv. 1087, 1088 (1984).
3. See generally Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of
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violator, but increasingly on those who aid and abet in the illegal con-
duct.' Aiding and abetting has been found to be a violation of section
10(b) and Rule lOb-56 giving rise to liability equal to that of the primary
perpetrators.7
The theory of aiding and abetting liability has its roots in both crim-
inal' and tort common-law9 doctrines. However, the Restatement of
1934, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 80, 83-88 (1981); Note, The Recognition ofAiding and Abetting in the
Federal Securities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REv. 821, 823 (1986).
4. See, ag., 5 A. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5 § 40.02, at 2-
391 (1987) ("A person aids or abets another person... when he knows or is reckless in not
knowing that a violation is occurring and he renders substantial assistance either by remaining
silent or inactive when he has a duty to speak or act, or by taking affirmative action."). Stated
in general terms, "aider and abettor liability is a theory of secondary liability intended to apply
to 'fringe' parties who knowingly assist in a primary violation." Hokama v. E.F. Hutton &
Co., 566 F. Supp. 636, 642 (C.D. Cal. 1983).
5. It is important to differentiate between primary and secondary liability. Professor Fis-
chel has defined secondary liability under the securities laws as a term:
used to describe the judicially implied civil liability which has been imposed on de-
fendants who have not themselves been held to have violated the express prohibition
of the securities statute at issue, but who have some relationship with the primary
wrongdoer. Courts have imposed this type of liability on defendants who aid and
abet, conspire with, or employ a defendant who does violate the express prohibition
of a statute.
Fischel, supra note 3, at 80 n.4.
6. Id. at 82-83. See A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 40.02, at 2-391.
7. See, eg., Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 151-55 (7th Cir.
1969) (aiders and abettors are jointly and severally liable with the primary violator), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Kalinski v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 609 F. Supp. 649, 652-53
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (aider-abettor not liable for damages prior to assistance); Morgan v. Pruden-
tial Funds, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 628, 633 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (aider-abettor cannot be liable for
damages if joined after all damages incurred); In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76
F.R.D. 351, 374-75 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (aiders and abettors who join part way into a scheme
are jointly and severally liable for damages accruing prior to enlistment); see also Kerbs v. Fall
River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731, 740 (10th Cir. 1974); Felts v. National Account Sys. Ass'n,
Inc., 469 F. Supp. 54, 68 (N.D. Miss. 1978); Sprayregen v. Livingston Oil Co., 295 F. Supp.
1376, 1378 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Pettit v. American Stock Exch., 217 F. Supp. 21, 28 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[i]f the encouragement or assistance is a
substantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is
responsible for the consequences of the other's acts." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 836 (1977).
8. Aiding and abetting is a concept of criminal law where "'[i]n order to aid and abet
another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant "in some sort associate himself with
the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek
by his action to make it succeed."' " Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F. Supp.
719, 725 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619 (1949),
quoting United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2nd Cir. 1949)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 2(a)
(1986) (anyone who "aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures [the perpetration of
a crime], is punishable as a principal"); CAL. PENAL CODE § 31 (West 1989) ("All persons
concerned in the commission of a crime... whether they directly commit the act constituting
1190
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Torts provides the most notable articulation of the concept by stating
that:
For harm resulting to a third person from tortious conduct of
another, a person is liable if he (a) orders or induces such con-
duct, knowing of the conditions under which the act is done or
intending the consequences which ensue, or (b) knows that the
other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substan-
tial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct
himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the other in ac-
complishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person. 1°
Recently, the concept of aiding and abetting has become increas-
ingly important in federal securities violations, since in many cases, the
primary violator is either insolvent or bankrupt and plaintiff's counsel
may bring actions against anyone who might have the ability to pay the
judgment, no matter how remotely connected with the transaction. 1
Generally, Rule lOb-5 actions for aiding and abetting liability are
brought against banks, for they tend to have "deep pockets," 2 and attor-
neys and brokers because they generally carry liability insurance.' 3 As
the offense, or aid and abet in its commission, or, not being present, have advised and en-
couraged its commission... are principal...
9. See infra note 10.
10. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977). The first case to rely upon the
Restatement was Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 680 (N.D.
Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U. S. 989 (1970). Section 876
of the Restatement of Torts, cited in Brennan, is substantially the same as the Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 876. See infra notes 35-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Brennan.
11. See, eg., Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert de-
nied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). In Landy, the plaintiff sued the primary violator, who stole money
from the bank (causing plaintiff injury as a shareholder), as well as the following: (1) twelve
brokerage firms and sixteen individuals associated with those firms, (2) the New York Stock
Exchange, (3) the National State Bank of Elizabeth, New Jersey, (4) a firm of certified public
accountants, (5) the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and (6) the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation. Id. at 143-44. "This is a relatively modest example of people being sued in
federal securities law cases." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATIONS CASES &
MATERIALS, 1139 n.3 (5th ed. 1982).
Aiders and abettors are also jointly and severally liable with the primary violator; thus,
they may make good "deep pocket" defendants. See infra note 12; see also Kerbs, 502 F.2d at
740.
12. A "deep pocket" defendant is a party commonly referred to in many areas of the law
as a defendant who has a vast reserve of readily available cash which could be used to satisfy a
judgment.
13. Due to the vast number of Rule lOb-5 actions filed against banks, lawyers, and ac-
countants, liability insurance coverage has become prohibitively expensive and generally un-
available. See Wall St. J., Aug. 15, 1986, § 7, col. 1 (pac. coast ed.).
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plaintiffs continue to endeavor to expand the pool of potential defend-
ants, courts too have been receptive to the acceptance of aiding and abet-
ting common-law principles in securities laws. 4
The Supreme Court of the United States has never validated the use
of aiding and abetting as a proper theory of liability under Rule lOb-5;
thus, there may be doubt as to its continued viability. 5 However, the
lower courts appear to have established the legitimacy of aiding and abet-
ting liability.' 6 They have recognized that Rule lOb-5's basic principles
would be circumvented if defendants who knowingly assist in securities
violations were free to do so with impunity.17
Generally, the United States Courts of Appeals concur that the
plaintiff must prove three basic elements to establish liability based on an
aiding and abetting theory under Rule 10b-5.18 The general test requires:
14. See, e.g., Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311-13 (9th Cir.
1982); Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680 (aiding and abetting recognized as a supplement to secon-
dary liability).
15. See generally Fischel, supra note 3. In Hochfelder, 424 U.S. at 185-86, an aiding and
abetting case, the Supreme Court neither invalidated nor addressed the validity of such a cause
of action. However, the continued vitality of aiding and abetting liability has been questioned
by a string of Ninth Circuit cases, known collectively as the Seaboard case. See (1) Admiralty
Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301, 1311 n.12 (9th Cir. 1982); (2) Admiralty Fund
v. Tabor, 677 F.2d 1297, 1299 n.2 (9th Cir. 1982); and (3) Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d
1289, 1294 nn.3-4 (9th Cir. 1982). Notwithstanding, the Ninth Circuit in Harmsen v. Smith,
693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983), in response to the Seaboard
cases, pronounced that "[i]n the absence of any authority or compelling reason for holding that
aider and abettor liability no longer exists, we hold that it remains a viable part of securities
regulation." Id. at 944; see also Congregation of the Passion v. Kidder Peabody & Co., Inc.,
800 F.2d 177, 183 (7th Cir. 1986) ("This court has nevertheless held that such a cause of
action [aiding and abetting liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5] may be maintained
under certain circumstances." (citing Baker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d
490 (7th Cir. 1986)); SEC v. Holschuh, 694 F.2d 130, 140 n.15 (7th Cir. 1982).
16. The notion that liability exists for aiding and abetting violations under Rule l0b-5 has
been accepted by every court of appeals that has faced the issue. See, e.g., Schneberger v.
Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477 (11th Cir. 1988); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir.
1983); Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983);
Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981); Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d
168 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570
F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef
Co., 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem.
Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977); Woodward v. Metro
Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 908 (1975); Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), aff'd, 546
F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976).
17. See, e.g., Aldrich v. New York Stock Exch., 446 F. Supp. 348, 355 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
18. See, e.g., Investors Research Corp., 628 F.2d at 178; IIT, An Int'l. Inv. Trust v.
Cormfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen, 579 F.2d at 799; Rochez Brothers, Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Woodward, 522 F.2d at 93, 97; see also Ruder,
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(1) a violation of Rule lOb-5 by a primary party; (2) that the aider and
abettor had knowledge of the violation; and (3) that the aider and abettor
substantially assisted in the fulfillment of the primary violation.' 9 While
the courts now generally agree on all aspects of the primary violation
required, there is a lack of accord as to how the second and third prongs
of the test are to be applied.20 Since the Supreme Court has failed to give
the courts direction and the courts of appeals have not agreed on how the
elements are to be applied, the lower courts have been without the neces-
sary guidance to decide Rule lOb-5 cases.
This Comment undertakes to study the courts of appeals' inconclu-
sive statements and analyses by examining the historical development of
aiding and abetting liability, the respective formulations of each element
of the existing test and policy considerations behind the securities laws.2'
The remaining sections advance a model for a "sliding-scale, flexible-fac-
tor" analysis.22 In proposing this model, the Comment endeavors to bal-
ance Rule lOb-5's goal of protecting the investor with the need to have
vigorous securities markets 3 and to formulate a consistent but fair ap-
proach to liability under Rule lOb-5 cases. In the process, this Comment
sets out several relevant factors courts should apply to reconcile the re-
spective relationships between the knowledge and assistance prongs, and
suggests some possible results of certain combinations of factors..
Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, In Pari
Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 627-38 (1972).
19. See infra note 53 for a slightly different articulation of the elements required to find
aiding and abetting liability.
20. See infra notes 67-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the knowledge prong
and see infra notes 78-111 and accompanying text for a discussion of the substantial assistance
prong.
21. See supra notes 24-111 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 112-205 and accompanying text.
23. In Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970), the Fifth Circuit set out the
proper concerns in determining standards of relief. The court stated:
In the formulation of relief, however, concepts of fairness to those who are expected
to govern their conduct under Rule lOb-5 should be considered. Protection for in-
vestors is of primary importance, but it must be kept in mind that the nation's wel-
fare depends upon the maintenance of a viable, vigorous business community.
Considered alone, the sweeping language of Rule 10b-5 creates an almost completely
undefined liability. All that the rule requires for its violation is that someone 'do
something bad,' in connection with a purchase or sale of securities. Without further
delineation, civil liability is formless, and the area of proscribed activity could be-
come so great that the beneficial aspects of the rule would not warrant the proscrip-
tion. In recognition of this problem, courts have sought to construct workable limits
to liability under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 which will accommodate the interests
of investors, the business community, and the public generally.
Id. at 804-05 (citations omitted); accord Woodward, 522 F.2d at 91.
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II. PURPOSE AND EVOLUTION OF AIDING AND ABETTING
LIABILITY IN THE RULE lOb-5 CONTEXT
A. Design of the Securities Laws
It is well recognized that Congress had broad remedial goals in pass-
ing the securities laws and providing civil remedies.24 These laws were
enacted in response to the inequitable distribution of relevant informa-
tion in the free-wheeling 1920s and the depression years of the early
1930s.25 To alleviate the problem, the securities laws were designed to
encourage the dissemination of complete and accurate information help-
ful to the investing public and to combat fraudulent interstate
transactions.26
At the heart of the securities laws is the goal of protecting the in-
vesting public.27 Consistent with this goal, the Supreme Court of the
United States has maintained that courts interpret federal securities laws,
such as Rule lOb-5, "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to ef-
fectuate [their] remedial purposes.""
In achieving investor protection, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
identified that one of the major objectives of federal securities regulation
is "to achieve a high standard of business ethics.., in every facet of the
24. See Pinter v. Dahli, 108 S. Ct. 2063, 2081-82 (1988) ("the Court has recognized that
Congress had 'broad remedial goals' in enacting the securities laws and providing civil reme-
dies"); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 200 (1976) (realizing Congress' broad reme-
dial goals in enacting express civil remedies).
25. See generally Silver v. New York State Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 366 (1963), over-
ruled on other grounds, Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc., v. Pacific Stationary & Printing
Co., 472 U.S. 84 (1985).
26. See L JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 11, at 78; see also Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) ("primary purpose of the Securities Exchange Act was to
... 'provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities to assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among investors.' ") (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 94-229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., at 91 (1975)).
The condition of the securities markets affects the stream of new capital into private enter-
prise, thus affecting the nation's overall economic growth. Further, original distributions of
securities are promoted by investors' confidence in the securities markets. Thus, the actual
state of the markets and public opinion toward the conditions of the markets are believed to
have an important bearing on the state of the overall economy. See REPORT OF SPECIAL
STUDY OF SECuRrIs MARKETS, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1963); A.
JACOBS, supra note 4, § 6.01-05, at 1-185-96.
27. "The 1934 Act was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of
stock prices through regulation of transactions ... and to impose regular reporting require-
ments." Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 194-95; see S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1934);
H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-5 (1933); A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 6.06 at 1-196-
202.
28. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972) (citing SEC v. Capi-
tal Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963); see also Superintendent of Ins. v.
Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971).
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securities industry."29 Accordingly, it is essential to an honest and effi-
cient market that there be a "justifiable expectation of the securities mar-
ketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges have
relatively equal access to material information,"3 and "be subject to
identical market risks."31 At the same time, however, there must be a
balancing of the investor's need for equal knowledge against preserving
an environment conducive to the pursuit of business and professional
ventures necessary for a robust securities industry.32 In close cases, the
balance should "be resolved in favor of those the statute is designed to
protect," the public investor.33
In sum, the securities laws were designed to set a minimum standard
of behavior for those who participate in the securities industry.34 Thus,
courts should apply the securities laws flexibly to effectuate the goals and
objectives of Rule lOb-5 to create a market free of manipulation and one
of high investor confidence. This next section examines how courts have
29. United States v. Nafain, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979) (quoting SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186-87 (1963)). "One of the principal policies behind the
Act is to protect investors against fraud and, through the imposition of specified civil liabilities,
to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing." Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d
1511, 1522 (10th Cir. 1983) (Halloway, J., concurring and dissenting); cf. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 195.
In passing the first major piece of legislation on securities regulation, the Securities Act of
1933, Congress explicitly proclaimed the essential purpose of the regulation of the markets:
The purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and honest business ....
The aim is to prevent further exploitation of the public by the sale of unsound, fraud-
ulent, and worthless securities through misrepresentation; to place adequate and true
information before the investor; to protect honest enterprise, seeking capital by hon-
est presentation, against the competition afforded by dishonest securities offered to
the public through crooked promotion; to restore the confidence of the prospective
investor in his ability to select sound securities; to bring in to productive channels of
industry and development capital which has grown timid to the point of hoarding;
and to aid in providing employment and restoring buying and consumer power.
S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
30. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1968). It is generally assumed that the price of a security reflects all relevant information
available to the market at that time. Thus when the market is manipulated through misrepre-
sentations or omissions, the information accessible on the market is not indicative of the secur-
ities' value. Those who have the honest and complete information can use it to their advantage
at the expense of the investing public. R. POSNER & K. ScoTT, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION
LAW AND SECURTIES REGULATION 156, 157-58 (1980).
31. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 852.
32. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).
33. Id.
34. In Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 200, the Supreme Court acknowledged that "Congress did
create [in some circumstances] express liability predicated upon a failure to exercise reasonable
care." Furthermore,* in SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938
(1977), the Third Circuit stated that "the antifraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
designed to insure high standards of conduct in securities transactions within this country in
addition to protecting domestic markets and investors from the effects of fraud." Id. at 116.
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applied these policies to develop a cause of action against those who aid
others in securities violations.
B. Historical Development of Aiding and Abetting Liability
Building on the Supreme Court's appreciation for the need to be
flexible in developing civil remedies, lower courts have developed a cause
of action for aiding and abetting liability.35 Aiding and abetting liability
for civil damages is not explicitly mentioned in section 10(b) or Rule 10b-
5.36 In the leading early case of Brennan v. Midwestern United Life In-
surance Co.," decided in 1966, the district court implied such a cause of
action.38 In Brennan, the plaintiff claimed that the defendant aided and
abetted a broker who allegedly violated section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.39
The complaint contended that in order to receive an economic benefit
from the artificial mark-up on its stock caused by the fraud, the alleged
aider-abettor allowed and encouraged the fraudulent scheme to con-
35. See infra notes 16, 52 and 71.
36. See supra notes 6-7 and 15-16 and accompanying text. Although aiding and abetting
liability is not mentioned in Rule 10b-5, it is considered elsewhere in the federal securities
statutes. The term is in the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (Investment Act), 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b (1982); see, eg., id. at § 80b-9(e) (SEC given power to enjoin violations of Securities
Exchange Act by aiders and abettors); id. at § 80b-3(e)(5) (SEC given power to hold liable any
investment advisor who "has willfully aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, or pro-
cured" violation of securities laws). Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act
deal with concepts that impose liability on those who do not participate directly in a violation
of the federal securities law. See, eg., Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976); Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976). In 1959 Congress contemplated but re-
jected an amendment to the securities acts which included aiding and abetting as a direct
violation of the acts. See Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 275-76 (1959) (due to industry fears, SEC agreed to clarify
the bill to provide that no civil liability was intended); Hearings Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 93, 103 (1959). For a further dis-
cussion of this amendment, see supra note 41; see also S. REp. No. 1757, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 9
(1960) (purpose of bill was to strengthen and clarify the injunctive power of SEC). However,
the House Committee Report on Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 approved the judicial
application of the aider and abettor concept. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, H.R.
REP. No. 355, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1983). See Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5:
Judicial Revision or Legislative Intent?, Nw. U.L. REV. 627, 642-60 (1963); Ferrara & Sanger,
Derivative Liability in Securities Law: Controlling Persons Liability, Respondeat Superior, and
Aiding and Abetting, 16 SEC. L. Rav. 97, 112 (1984); Note, supra note 3, at 1091.
37. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 989 (1970).
38. Id. at 680-81. The doctrine of aiding and abetting was first introduced into the federal
securities laws in SEC disciplinary proceedings and injunction actions. See, e.g., SEC v. Scott
Taylor & Co., 183 F. Supp. 904, 909 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Southeastern Sec. Corp., 29 S.E.C.
609, 615 (1949); Burley & Co., 23 S.E.C. 461, 464 (1946); Bruns, Nordeman & Co., 40 S.E.C.
652, 659, 662 (1961). See generally A. JAcoBs, supra note 4, at 2-391-92.
39. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 675.
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tinue.4 Implying the cause of action, the district court acknowledged
that both the statute and legislative history were devoid of any express
indication that Congress intended to hold aiders and abettors liable for
the violations of others a.4  Nevertheless, the court reasoned that by not
expressly excluding liability for activity that aids and abets a violation of
the securities laws, Congress implied that a private remedy could be for-
mulated by the court:42
[A] statute with a broad and remedial purpose such as the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 should not easily be rendered
impotent to deal with new and unique situations within the
scope of the evils intended to be eliminated. In the absence of a
clear legislative expression to the contrary, the statute must be
flexibly applied so as to implement its policies and purposes. In
this regard, it cannot be said that civil liability for damages, so
well established under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
may never under any circumstances be imposed upon persons
who do no more than aid and abet a violation of Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5. a3
In establishing the breadth of liability for aiding and abetting, the court
relied upon section 876 of the Restatement of Torts.'4 The court asserted
that "general principles of law should continue to guide the development
of federal common law remedies under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." 45
Thus, the court viewed aiding and abetting liability as a "logical and
natural complement" to implying a private right under section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5, which have their roots in tort principles.46
40. Id. The defendant attacked the complaint's sufficiency on the ground that there was
no congressional intent to impose liability for those who aid and abet in violation of section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Id. at 679-80.
41. Id. at 677-78. The defendant argued that Congress' failure to amend section 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 to allow for explicit liability for aiders and abettors represented a congressional
intent not to incorporate these remote parties. Id. at 678. See, eg., H.R. 5001, 86th. Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959) and S. 1178 (1959), which would have made it uhlawfuil "for any person to aid,
abet, counsel, command, induce or procure the violation of any provisions of [the Securities
Act of 1933]." Securities Acts Amendments, 1959, Hearings on H.R. 5001 Before a Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1959). In
SEC Legislation: Hearings on S. 1178-1182 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Bank-
ing and Currency, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 288 (1959), the SEC agreed that clarification of the bill
to read "no civil liability is intended," was necessary due to the industry fears that "private
litigants... may find this section a vehicle by which to sue aiders and abettors." Id.
42. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
43. Id. at 680-81.
44. Id at 680 (citing FESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876 (1939)). See supra note 10 and
accompanying text.
45. Brennan, 259 F. Supp. at 680.
46. Id. The judicial implication of a private right of action under Section 10(b) and Rule
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Building upon Brennan, the Third Circuit in Landy v. Federal De-
posit Insurance Corp. , articulated a three-part test that must be satisfied
for a finding of aiding and abetting liability. The court must conclude
"(1) that an independent wrong exist[s]; (2) that the aider or abettor
kn[e]w of that wrong's existence; and (3) that substantial assistance [was]
given in effecting that wrong."4 Although, the plaintiff in Landy was
unable to prove all the elements,4 9 courts have used Landy's formulation
as the foundation in developing the modem tests. The next two sections
of this Comment address the prevailing requirements for aiding and abet-
ting liability and the lower courts' interpretations of these standards.
III. PREVAILING STANDARDS FOR AIDING AND ABETTING
LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 10(b) AND RULE lOb-5
Traditionally, most courts have agreed that three requirements must
be satisfied in order to impose aider-abettor liability under Rule 10b-5.5 °
In SEC v. Coffey,"1 the Seventh Circuit pronounced the most frequently
cited articulation of the three-part test: "[I]f [1] some other person has
committed a securities law violation, if [2] the accused party had general
awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper,
and if [3] the accused aider-abettor knowingly and substantially assisted
in the violation," 2 then that accused party shall be liable for aiding and
lOb-5 was founded upon tort principles. See supra note 10 and Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
47. 468 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974). See infra text notes 48-
49, 54-61 and 80-82 and accompanying text for an analysis of Landy.
48. Landy, 468 F.2d at 162-63. In Landy, the shareholders of an insolvent bank brought
an action against numerous defendants for damages from losses caused by the bank president's
misuse of bank funds in speculative securities transactions. Id. at 143-44. See supra note 11
for a list of the defendants.
49. Landy, 468 F.2d at 163. The plaintiff in Landy was unable to prove the requisite
assistance to justify aiding and abetting liability. Id. "In this case, it would appear that the
amount of assistance given by the brokers was minor." Id. See infra notes 80-82 and accom-
panying text for the standards of assistance required by Landy.
50. See, e.g., Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Woodward v.
Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 94-95 (5th Cir. 1975). See also supra note 19 and accompanying
text.
51. 439 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
52. Id. at 1316. The Coffey court, in setting forth the three-part test, qualified its state-
ment by saying it was not "set[ting] forth an inflexible definition of aiding and abetting [liabil-
ity]." Id. at 1316. However, most courts have followed Coffey's lead. For other courts
following the Coffey formulation, see Woodward, 522 F.2d at 94-96; Metge v. Baehler, 762
F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 974 U.S. 1057 (1986); Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock,
Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1985); SEC v. Washington County Util.
Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 224 (6th Cir. 1982); Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 119
(2d Cir. 1982); Walck v. American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 790-91 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942 (1983); Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301,
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abetting. However, some courts relying upon the same general elements
have pronounced a slightly different formulation. 3 Thus, it is necessary
to examine each element of the tripartite test to determine how different
courts have viewed each element.
A. Violation By Primary Party or Independent Wrong
In the pioneering case of Landy v. Federal Deposit Insurance
Corp.,54 the Third Circuit required that the primary party need only
commit "an independent wrong," rather than actually violate the securi-
ties laws. 5 The majority of courts, however, have required that a party
other than the aider-abettor have violated a securities law.5 6 For exam-
ple, in Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas,7 the Fifth Circuit criticized
the Landy standard as failing to make the necessary connection to the
securities laws.58 The court theorized that a standard not requiring a
connection to the securities laws such as Landy's would result in liability
for one who knew of the existence of a wrong, although he was unaware
of his role in the scheme.59 Capitulating to the criticism, the Third Cir-
1311 (9th Cir. 1982); Admiralty Fund v. Jones, 677 F.2d 1289, 1295-96 (9th Cir. 1982); Admi-
ralty Fund v. Tabor, 677 F.2d 1297, 1299 (9th Cir. 1982); Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932,
943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 782-83
(8th Cir. 1981); 1IT, An Int'l. Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922, 925, 927 (2d Cir.
1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 930 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cerL denied,
439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Landy v.
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960
(1974).
53. Although there is a general consensus as to the elements required to find liability,
courts have disagreed about the specific requirements. The three-part test has sometimes been
articulated slightly differently requiring:
(1) the existence of a securities law violation by the primary (as opposed to the aiding
and abetting) party; (2) 'knowledge' of this violation on the part of the aider and
abettor; and (3) 'substantial assistance' by the aider and abettor in the achievement of
the primary violation.
IT, 619 F.2d at 922.
54. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
55. Id. at 162.
56. See supra note 50.
57. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
58. Id. at 95.
59. Id. In Woodward, the court recognized that it was essential that "[a] remote party not
only be aware of his role, but he should also know when and to what degree he is furthering
the fraud." Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95.
Landy also omitted the knowing requirement for the substantial assistance prong. This
formulation risks the danger of over-inclusiveness and seems to lose sight of the required con-
nection to the securities laws. See infra notes 80-82 criticizing Landy's formulation of the
substantial assistance prong.
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cuit in Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.," retreated from the
standard set forth in Landy and identified the first requirement as "a
commission of a wrongful act-an underlying securities violation." 61 A
consensus among the circuits is now established that there must be a
primary violation of the securities laws for the first prong of the test to be
satisfied. 2
Courts find a primary violation when a plaintiff proves that the pri-
mary actor violated all the elements of a private civil action under section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 3 In addition, determining who is the primary
violator is usually not very difficultf 46 However, some courts require that
the plaintiff specifically identify the primary violator so that the court
can determine if those who allegedly assisted in the wrongful conduct
may even be exposed to possible aiding and abetting liability.65  In sum,
an aider-abettor cannot be held liable without first establishing a primary
violation. 6 Once a primary violation is established the remaining two
elements of aiding and abetting liability also must be fulfilled.
60. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
61. Id. at 799.
62. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
63. See Ruder, supra note 18, at 600. The elements of a modem section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 claim are: (1) a material misrepresentation or omission; (2) made in connection with the
purchase or sale of a security; (3) upon which the purchaser or seller reasonably relied; (4)
which causes a loss; and (5) scienter on the part of the person who made the misrepresentation
or omission. See, eg., Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (manipulative or
deceptive requirement); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (materi-
ality); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1975) (scienter); Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (in connection with the purchase or sale); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972) (reliance). See Reliance Ins. Co. v. Eisner &
Lubin, 685 F. Supp. 449, 453 (D.N.J. 1988) (citing Pel v. Speiser, 806 F.2d 1154 (3d Cir.
1986)); Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs
Be Denied Recovery, 71 CORNELL L. Rnv. 96, 99-100 (1985), for a similar list of the requisite
elements of a Rule lob-5 securities fraud cause of action.
64. See, eg., Chemical Bank v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 552 F. Supp. 439, 454-55
(S.D.N.Y. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 726 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884
(1984). Cf. Klein v. Computer Devices, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 270, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also
Kaliski v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 609 F. Supp. 649 (N.D. Inl. 1985) (acts constituting
aiding and abetting must have occurred before completion of allegedly fraudulent transaction,
although one can be held primarily liable for damages incurred as direct result of "lulling
activities"); Sheftelman v. N. L. Industries, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 92,040, at 91,190
(D.N.J. Feb. 1, 1985) (necessity "to prove a securities violation ... in no way indicates that the
primary violator need be named as a defendant" (emphasis in original)).
65. See Ruder, supra note 18, at 600. See also Employers Ins. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson &
Curtis, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 98,792, at 94,065 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1982) (it is not
necessary to sue the principal violator).
66. It should be noted that some courts will dismiss an aiding and abetting complaint
where the plaintiff fails to adequately allege the existence of a primary securities law violation.
See, e-g., Morgan v. Prudential Funds, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) %96,345, at 93,172
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 1978).
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B. General Awareness or Knowledge
The courts now agree that the primary violation must be of the se-
curities laws; however, there is discord over what level of knowledge 7
the aider-abettor must possess to be held liable. 8  At a minimum, the
aider-abettor must have scienter, "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud."69 The courts of appeals conflict over
the level of knowledge that comprises scienter.
The most notable and followed articulation of the knowledge re-
quirement provides that the aider and abettor have a "general awareness
that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper." 70 How-
67. Knowledge is a critical element in proving aiding and abetting liability: "[W]ithout
this requirement financial institutions, brokerage houses, and other such organizations would
be virtual insurers of their customers against security law violations. Culpability of some sort
is necessary to justify punishment of a secondary actor and mere unknowing participation in
another's violation is an improper predicate to liability." Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef
Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978). In Investors Research
Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980), the court stated
that "[t]he awareness of wrong-doing requirement for aiding and abetting liability is designed
to insure that innocent, incidental participants in transactions later found to be illegal are not
subjected to harsh, civil, criminal, or administrative penalties." See also Sennott v. Rodman &
Renshaw, 474 F.2d 32, 39 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 926 (1973); Lowenschuss v. Kane,
367 F. Supp. 911, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd, 520 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1975); A. JACOBS, supra
note 4, at 2-398-99; Ruder, supra note 18, at 638.
68. Compare SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
908 (1975) (general awareness that the aider-abettor's role was part of an overall activity that
was improper) and Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975) with Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975) ("It has been held that liability for aiding
and abetting may be found on less than actual knowledge of the illegal activity.... How much
or how little knowledge would seem to vary with the facts of each case. Courts that have
considered the knowledge requirement have differed somewhat on its scope.").
69. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 n.12 (1976). In Hochfelder, the
Supreme Court declined to resolve whether recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement;
however, it did note that "[i]n certain areas of the law recklessness is considered to be a form
of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act." Id.
In Baker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir. 1986), the court
stated:
We take Ernst & Ernst, together with Herman & MacLean, as establishing that aid-
ers, abettors, conspirators, and the like may be liable only if they have the same
mental state required for primary liability. No one may be held liable without proof
that he acted with scienter otherwise the premise of Herman & MacLean will not be
satisfied.
Id. at 495 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
70. Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1316. In Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985),
the court in discussing the "general awareness" element noted that:
[Tihe surrounding circumstances and expectations of the parties were critical, be-
cause knowledge of the existence of a violation must usually be inferred.... For
instance, stronger evidence of complicity would be required for the alleged aider and
abettor who conducts what appears to be a transaction in the ordinary course of his
business.... [K]nowledge could be shown by circumstantial evidence, or by reckless
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ever, other courts have turned to a "sliding-scale" of knowledge to deter-
mine aiding and abetting liability.71 For example, in Woodward v. Metro
Bank of Dallas,72 the Fifth Circuit noted that factors such as whether the
transaction was of an ordinary nature or atypical,7
3 the type of security74
and whether there was any special duty present,7 determined the degree
conduct, but... 'the proof must demonstrate actual awareness of the party's role in
the fraudulent scheme.'
Id. at 1009-10 (citations omitted).
In Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95, following the reasoning of Coffey, the court attacked the
Landy court's decision that required that the accused merely have knowledge of the primary
violation. The Woodward court recognized that "[o]ne could know of the existence of a
'wrong' without being aware of his role in the scheme, and it is the participation that is at
issue." Id. However, the Third Circuit still allows liability for aider-abettors who do not have
knowledge of their role in the violation, but have consciously involved themselves in the im-
propriety or constructive notice of intended impropriety, which may be demonstrated by the
aider-abettor's general awareness of his role as part of an overall activity that is improper.
Monsen, 579 F.2d at 79; see also Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir.
1976).
71. For example, the Fifth Circuit in Woodward stated that the knowledge requirement is
not a static standard but a flexible, sliding-scale requirement, in that "[k]nowledge may be
shown by circumstantial evidence, or by reckless conduct, but the proof must demonstrate
actual awareness of the party's role in the fraudulent scheme... [where] the surrounding
circumstances and expectations of the parties are critical." Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95-96; see
also Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490,497 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he
plaintiff must support the inference [of scienter or knowledge] with some reason to conclude
that the defendant has thrown in his lot with the primary violators.... If the plaintiff does not
have direct evidence of scienter, the court should ask whether the fraud (or cover-up) was in
the interest of the [aiding and abetting] defendants. Did they gain by bilking the buyers of the
securities?"); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., Inc., 579 F.2d at 799 (" 'the require-
ment of knowledge may be less strict where the alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from
the wrongdoing' ") (quoting Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir.
1975)); SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 226 (6th Cir. 1982) ("if the
alleged aider and abettor conducts a transaction of an extraordinary nature, less evidence of his
complicity is necessary"); Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975) ("It has
been held that liability for aiding and abetting may be found on less than actual knowledge of
the illegal activity.... How much or little knowledge would seem to vary with the facts of
each case.").
72. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975). Although Woodward was decided prior to Hochfelder,
the analysis is still relevant since the court in Woodward stressed the requirement that scienter
was a component of knowledge, id. at 95-96, and thus is consistent with Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
at 194.
73. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95 ("If the alleged aider and abettor conducts what appears to
be a transaction in the ordinary course of his business, more evidence of his complicity is
essential."). See also Bane v. Sigmundr Exploration Corp., 848 F.2d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 1988).
See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text for a discussion on the importance of a duty in
determining aiding and abetting liability.
74. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95. See infra note 154 and accompanying text.
75. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95-96 ("Still, even for facially ordinary commercial transac-
tions, a court may be influenced by a special duty imposed by the securities acts on the particu-
lar type of party, such as an insider, a controlling person, an accountant, or a broker."). See
infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text. A duty to disclose may arise upon "knowing assist-
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of scienter or knowledge required to hold an aider and abettor liable.76
Still other courts have held that where a person makes representations
that are foreseeably relied upon, a standard lower than that of actual
knowledge will fulfill the scienter or knowledge requirement."
C. Substantial Assistance: Affirmative Acts, Inaction, Nondisclosure
and Causation
Under the third prong of the aiding and abetting test, courts have
generally agreed that the plaintiff must prove that the aider-abettor has
"substantially assisted" in the primary violator's securities violation.78
In applying this element, most courts have held that ingrained in this
requirement is the concept of knowledge.79 Although in Landy v. Fed-
ance of or... upon consent and approval[ ] of fraudulent practices by a director," Strong v.
France, 478 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) or upon some special obligations imposed by law.
Woodward, 522 F.2d at 97 n.28.
In many circuits, the issue of whether the aider-abettor owed the plaintiff a duty is impor-
tant. Many circuits will not apply a recklessness standard without first establishing the exist-
ence of a duty. See, eg., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983); Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillion & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). Gener-
ally, as a matter of proof, recklessness is easier to prove than actual knowledge. Thus, plain-
tiffs have stretched the dimensions of traditional duties in order to decrease the degree of
culpability necessary to hold an aider-abettor liable. See also, Woodward, 522 F.2d at 97;
Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("[T]he
existence and nature of the regulatory system under which brokerage firms operate warrants
the application of a recklessness standard in this case.").
76. In Woodward, the court stated that:
Generally speaking, though, the securities acts do not impose strict liability upon all
who come in contact with a security. The postman who mails a fraudulent letter is
not covered by the [Securities Exchange] Act, nor is the company that manufactured
the paper on which the violating documents are printed.
Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96.
"'Tihe clue to liability is some sort of knowledge."' Id. (quoting A. BROMBERG, SE-
CURIFS LAW: FRAUD § 8.5, at 582 (1974)).
77. See, e.g., Woods, 765 F.2d at 1011 ("Several courts have applied a recklessness stan-
dard to alleged aiders and abettors who have issued statements or certifications foreseeably
relied upon by investors, reasoning that a duty to disclose arises under such circumstances.").
See infra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
78. See Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Harmsen v. Smith,
693 F.2d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822 (1983); Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779, 784 (8th Cir. 1981); IIT, An Int'l Investment Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 922
(2d Cir. 1980); Edward J. Mawood & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979); Rochez
Bros. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1975); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d
84, 94-97 (5th Cir. 1975); SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420
U.S. 908 (1975); Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); SEC v. International Chem. Dev., 469 F.2d 20, 27 (10th Cir.
1972); Lewis v. Midland Trust Co., 63 F.R.D. 39, 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
79. It is important to note that while there are two clear articulations of the three-part test,
both tests, although phrased differently, are comprised of the same elements. For example,
where the court requires only a general awareness of the aider-abettor's role in the fraud, the
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eral Deposit Insurance Corp.,"° the Third Circuit for a short time took a
more relaxed approach to the substantial assistance prong by not requir-
ing "knowing assistance,"81 the requirement of "knowingly and substan-
tially assisted" has now been accepted by every court that has addressed
the issue.
8 2
Although there seems to be unanimity about the requisite formula-
tion of the standard, there is considerable dissension among the circuits
as to how to apply the substantial assistance standard. Some courts have
turned to more specific devises such as section 876 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts83 to determine if the aider-abettor's assistance is sub-
stantial.84 In Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co.," the Third Cir-
cuit acknowledged the difficulty in determining whether conduct is
substantial, and turned to the Restatement for guidance:
The Restatement instructs the trier of fact to consider the fol-
lowing factors in determining whether a defendant's conduct
constitutes substantial assistance: (1) the amount of assistance
given by the defendant, (2) his presence or absence at the time
of the tort, (3) his relation to the other person, and (4) his state
of mind.
8 6
Other circuits have formulated their own definitions of "substantial
assistance." 87 However, most courts have tried to avoid such precise ar-
court will insist on knowing and substantial assistance in the violation. See, eg., Coffey, 493
F.2d at 1316. On the other hand, where the court requires knowledge of the violation on the
part of the aider-abettor, the court will require only substantial assistance. See, eg., Rolf v.
Blyth, Eastman Dillion & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978). What
both tests require is that the aider-abettor have some degree of knowledge of the securities
violation and his or her role in rendering substantial assistance in the violation. See SEC v.
Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 n.18 (6th Cir. 1982).
80. 486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
81. Id. at 162-63. Landy's omission of the "knowing" requirement for the substantial
assistance aspect was criticized in Woodward, where the Fifth Circuit argued that the aider-
abettor "must not only be aware of his role, but he should also know when and to what degree
he is furthering the fraud." Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95. Consequently, in Monsen v. Consoli-
dated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799-800 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978), the
Third Circuit adopted the "knowing and substantial assistance" formulation.
82. See, eg., Harmsen, 693 F.2d at 943-44; 11T, 619 F.2d at 922; Woodward, 522 F.2d at
95; Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1316.
83. See R=ESATE ME N, supra note 10, § 876(b).
84. See, eg., Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985); Monsen, 579 F.2d at
800; Landy, 486 F.2d at 163; Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069,
1083-84 (N.D. Cal. 1979), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1257 (1986).
85. 579 F.2d 793 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978).
86. Id. at 800 (citing Landy v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 486 F.2d 139, 162 (3d Cir.
1973), cert denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974)).
87. In Foltz v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143 (D.D.C. 1986), the
district court set out its own definition stating that "'[k]nowing assistance' means just that:
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ticulations and have looked to the actual conduct itself to make ad hoe
determinations of substantial assistance."8 To these courts, substantial
assistance might include "repeating... misrepresentations (or aiding in
their preparation), by acting as [a] conduitfl to accumulate or to dis-
tribute securities, by executing transactions or investing proceeds, or per-
haps by financing transactions." 9 Notwithstanding the difficulty the
courts of appeals have had in defining "substantial assistance," the type
of assistance and the doctrine of causation have also been a cause for
disagreement among the courts.
1. Types of substantial assistance
Along with defining substantial assistance, the courts of appeals
have differed on the specific types of assistance that qualify for aiding and
abetting liability. Assistance may take the form of either affirmative ac-
tion or silence or inaction.
a. substantial assistance through inaction and nondisclosure
At one time there was considerable argument whether an aider-abet-
tor could be held liable for mere inaction or silence.90 It is now well
that the party charged (1) has knowingly undertaken certain actions, (2) which it knows will
provide (3) assistance to the party committing the primary violation." Id. at 1163.
88. See A. BROMBERG, SEcuRITIES LAWS, § 8.5, at 515 (1974). Generally, these courts
require substantial assistance to mean something beyond mere "ministerial tasks," Wright v.
Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1983), and to mean "more than just a little aid,"
Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 496 (7th Cir. 1986).
89. A. BROMBERG, supra note 88, § 8.5, at 515. See also Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48 (assistance
was both active and passive).
90. In Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966),
aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970), the court held that
aiding and abetting liability could rest on the aider-abettor's acts or omissions. Id. at 677-79.
In Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., 502 F.2d 731, 739-40 (10th Cir. 1974), the Tenth Circuit held
that inaction alone was adequate to hold the aider-abettor liable. See also Edwards & Hanly v.
Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478, 484 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 444 U.S.
1045 (1980); Green v. Jonhop, 358 F. Supp. 413, 419 (D. Ore. 1973); Anderson v. Francis I.
duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Minn. 1968). However, Landy, 486 F.2d at 163-64
and Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 283 (9th Cir. 1971) absolutely rejected the notion that
aiding-abetting liability could stand on inaction alone without a duty to act. See also Ruder,
supra note 18, at 644 (arguing that even with a duty to disclose, silence as a basis for liability
applies only to primary liability, not to secondary liability); Barker, 797 F.2d at 495-97. It was
not until the Fifth Circuit in Woodward combined the teachings of Strong v. France, 474 F.2d
747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973) (liability for inaction or silence arises "only when a duty to disclose
has arisen"), and Coffey, 493 F.2d at 1317 (liability is to be imposed "only where it is shown
that the silence of the accused aider and abettor was consciously intended to aid the securities
law violation"), that the uncertainty was resolved. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96-97.
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established that where an aider-abettor has a duty to disclose or act, 91
silence or inaction may be sufficient to constitute substantial assistance.
92
Even in cases where implying such a duty is impossible, silence or inac-
tion may justify a Rule 10b-5 claim when it is either joined by an affirma-
tive act or is "consciously intended" to aid in the violation.93 Recently,
however, in Basic, Inc. v. Levinson,9' the Supreme Court found that in
the context of a primary violation, the failure to disclose is actionable
under Rule 10b-5 only if there is a duty to disclose.95 Thus, there is a
question whether an aider-abettor may be liable for silence absent a duty
to disclose. 96
b. substantial assistance through affirmative acts
When an aider-abettor affirmatively aids the primary violator,
courts have an easier time deciding aiding and abetting cases. Courts
have recognized the following affirmative acts as satisfying the substan-
91. See supra note 75 for a discussion on what relationships will result in the implication of
a duty.
92. See, eg., Metge, 762 F.2d at 624-25; Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir.
1983); Washington County, 676 F.2d at 226; I1T, 619 F.2d at 926-27; Woodward, 522 F.2d at
97; Kerbs, 502 F.2d at 739-40.
93. See, eg., Woodward, 522 F.2d at 94-95, 97.
94. 108 S. Ct. 978 (1988).
95. Id. at 987 n.17; see also Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (if no breach of a duty by
insider, then no breach by tippee); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (no liability
absent duty to disclose-insider has fiduciary duty to either disclose or abstain from trading).
96. There are courts that argue that the duty for a primary violator is different from that
of an aider-abettor. See, eg., Wright, 571 F. Supp. at 663 ("The primary violator's duty to
disclose arises from his involvement with the entity whose securities are at issue and his rela-
tionship to the plaintiffs. The secondary violator's duty arises from 'knowing assistance of or
participation in a fraudulent scheme.' "); H. L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp.
1332, 1335-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (Aiding-abetting liability "is not dependent upon any affirma-
tive duty to disclose. Rather, aiding and abetting liability may be present as a result of defend-
ants substantial assistance and participation in the wrong doing."); see also Sirota v. Solitron
Devices, Inc., 673 F.2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.) (whether there is a duty, not only has an effect on
the degree of scienter required to prove a violation, but decreases the level of scienter re-
quired), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982).
The above reliance on a difference between a primary and secondary violator's source of a
duty is illusory, for it avoids answering the question of whether there is a valid justification for
allowing silence to be considered assistance or participation in a fraudulent scheme without an
independent duty to disclose. See SECtUrrFas ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE, Liability for Insider
Trading Under the Federal Securities Laws, 235, 301 (1988). Contra Barker, 797 F.2d at 495-
96 (which noted that in context of sections 11 and 12 of the Exchange Act, if there is no
independent duty to speak, silence is not actionable under lOb-5). In Baker, the court noted
that "knowledge of a material omission is not enough to violate the act or rule." Id. at 495.
See also LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 928, 932 (7th Cir.) (in lob-5
aiding and abetting context, absent legal duty to disclose, silence alone not enough to hold
aider-abettor liable, moral culpability does not have legal consequences), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 311 (1988); First Interstate Bank v. Chapman & Cutler, 837 F.2d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1988).
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tial assistance9 7 requirement: the rendering of opinion letters;98 verifica-
tion of misleading financial statements in a prospectus; 99 audits;x10 letters
of recommendation; 0 1 functioning as conduits for circulation and collec-
tion of securities;'0 2 disclosing false information to securities firms and
concealing debt through falsification of bank records;10 3 and affirmative
concealment of fraud."°4
2. Causation: proximate or but-for requirement?
In interpreting "substantial assistance," courts have debated
whether principles of causation are incorporated into the "substantial
assistance" requirement.'00 Moreover, courts that have required a show-
ing of causation have not agreed on the appropriate standard. Some
courts require the assistance to be a "substantial causal factor in the per-
petration of . . . [the] fraud."'0 6 For example, in Woods v. Barnett
97. The element of substantial assistance does not necessitate the act required to have been
necessary to the scheme; it must merely contribute to the accomplishment of the scheme. See
Gross v. SEC, 418 F.2d 103, 106-07 (2d Cir. 1969); see also A. JACOBS, supra note 4, § 40.02,
at 2-400.
98. See, e-g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
99. Admiralty Fund v. Hugh Johnson & Co., 677 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982).
100. See, eg., Sirota, 673 F.2d at 569; Panzirer v. Wolf, 663 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1981), cert
denied, 458 U.S. 1107 (1982); Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
101. See, eg., Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004, 1007 (11th Cir. 1985); Hudson v.
Capital Management Int'l, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (citing Anderson v.
Francis I. duPont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 709 (D. Minn. 1968) ("Defendants 'knowing assist-
ance' in Anderson went beyond mere silence to include providing the principal defrauder with
office space, endorsing his skill as a commodities trader and holding him out as a valued
customer.").
102. See, e.g., Rolf, 570 F.2d at 48.
103. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. See, eg., Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 91.
105. See, eg., Woods, 765 F.2d at 1013 (11th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging a causal factor in
substantial assistance); Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1088
(N.D. Cal. 1979) ("A plaintiff must show some causal connection between the culpable con-
duct of the aider and abettor and the plaintiff's harm."). See generally Bloor v. Carro,
Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass, 754 F.2d 57, 61-62 (2d Cir. 1985); Metge, 762 F.2d at
624; Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d 478,484 (2d Cir. 1979),
cert denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1980); Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 92; Landy, 486 F.2d at 163;
Mishkin, 658 F. Supp. at 274; In re Gas Reclamation, Inc., Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493, 504
(S.D.N.Y. 1987); Connors v. Lexington Ins. Co., 666 F. Supp. 434, 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). Cf.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Drysdale See. Corp., 801 F.2d 13, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1986).
106. Rol, 570 F.2d at 48. In Rolf, the Second Circuit set out a general requirement that the
aider-abettor's conduct must be "a substantial causal factor in the perpetration of... [the]
fraud and in the culmination of... [plaintiff's] losses." Id.; see also Stokes v. Lokken, 644
F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1981) (causation required in terms of participation in preparation of fraudu-
lent brochure).
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Bank,1" 7 the Eleventh Circuit asserted a much more relaxed standard of
the causation requirement where "substantiality [in terms of assistance]
is based upon all the circumstances surrounding the transaction in ques-
tion."10 8 On the other hand, circuits have expressed the view that the
substantial assistance requirement necessitates the plaintiff proving that
the aider-abettor's conduct proximately caused the plaintiff's harm."°9
For example, in Bloor v. Carro, Spanbock, Londin, Rodman & Fass,110
the Second Circuit supported a strict causation requirement by stating
that "aid[ing] and abet[ting] liability [will] not attach where the injury
was not a direct or reasonably foreseeable result of the conduct." '
In sum, courts have had a difficult time determining the precise pa-
rameters of the three-part aiding and abetting test. Thus, courts have
sought a flexible approach to a complicated analysis. The next section
examines how courts have utilized such an approach.
V. THE SLIDING-SCALE ANALYSIS IN THE CONTEXT OF AIDING
AND ABETTING LIABILITY
In the area of aiding and abetting liability there has been an evolu-
tion of an ad hoc flexible analysis, based on a sliding scale of factors. A
majority of the courts of appeals and district courts have tried to add
substance to the existing three-part test 2 by harmonizing the balance
between knowledge and substantial assistance and the requisite proof for
each.1 13 These courts have employed a flexible analysis which allocates
107. 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985).
108. Id. at 1013. In Woods, the defendant had convinced the bank trustee to allow the
transaction to progress piecemeal without a full commitment by the underwriter to purchase
the entire issue. Id. The court stated that "[t]his act sealed the fate of the investor's money."
Id. The court upheld the aiding and abetting liability where the aider-abettor's conduct "was a
causal factor in the perpetration of the fraud and in the culmination of the investor's losses."
Id.
109. See, eg., Bloor, 754 F.2d at 61-62; Edwards & Hanly, 602 F.2d at 484; Metge, 762 F.2d
at 624; cf First Interstate Bank, 837 F.2d at 779 ("something more than but-for causation
required").
110. 754 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985).
111. Id. at 63.
112. See supra notes 120-68 and accompanying text.
113. See, eg., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (court
spoke favorably of proposition that where there is "passive failure to disclose ... inaction
cannot create liability as an aider and abettor unless the defendant recklessly violates an in-
dependent duty to act or manifests a conscious intention to further the principal violation");
Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 n.1 (8th Cir.) (leaving open question whether absent a
duty, recklessness may be applied), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1985); Woods v. Barnett Bank,
765 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (1 th Cir. 1985) (follows principles of Woodward); Monsen v. Consoli-
dated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 799 (3d Cir.) (the knowledge requirement is less where
aider-abettor derives benefit from wrongdoing), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Mishkin v.
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the proper levels of knowledge and assistance necessary for liability de-
pending upon certain factors. Some of these factors allow the courts to
infer knowledge or assistance, or both.114 In addition, the type of rela-
tionship among the parties is one factor that may justify requiring a
lower level of both knowledge and assistance. 1i
A. Flexible Analysis: Sliding Scale of Knowledge and Assistance
In determining whether aiding and abetting liability exists, courts
have looked to factors that ensure that strict liability is not imposed on
all who merely come into contact with a security involved in a violation
of the securities laws.1 16 Consequently, the courts following a flexible
analysis have relied upon such factors as the existence of a duty to dis-
close or act, T17 the type of transaction11 ' and type of benefit the aider-
abettor received from his or her role in the fraudulent scheme, 119 to de-
termine the proper levels of knowledge and assistance justifying aiding
and abetting liability.
• In the leading case formulating a flexible analysis, Woodward v.
Metro Bank,120 the Fifth Circuit consolidated the disjointed pronounce-
ment of prior case law into a comprehensive analysis. In Woodward, the
plaintiff cosigned a promissory note to a bank pledging some of its stock
as collateral against a debtor's present debts and all debts to the bank
that may accrue in the future.12' The plaintiff thought that the debtor
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (cases compiled); see
also Bane v. Sigmundr Exploration Corp., 848 F.2d 579, 581 (5th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex,
Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303-04 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3231 (1987); Cleary v. Perfectune,
Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777-79 (1st Cir. 1983); SEC v. Washington County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d
218, 226 (6th Cir. 1982); Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 822 (1983); IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 925 (2d Cir. 1980);
Investors Research Corp. v. SEC, 628 F.2d 168, 178 n.61 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S.
919 (1980); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1975); Foltz v. U.S. News
& World Report, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1143, 1162-63 (D.D.C. 1986).
114. See supra notes 120-68 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
116. Secondary liability should "not sweep up all people who can be characterized as par-
ticipants in or contributors to the success of the firm that issues the securities." Barker v.
Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490, 495 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Woodward,
522 F.2d 84, 96 (5th Cir. 1975); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
117. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. The source of a duty may also come
from the existence and nature of the regulatory scheme. See infra notes 164-65 and accompa-
nying text.
118. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 132-45 and accompanying text.
120. 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975).
121. Id. at 88.
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was a corporation, but in fact the debtor was an officer of the corporation
who deposited the loan proceeds into the corporate account.1 22 The
bank demanded payment from the plaintiff when the officer defaulted on
succeeding indebtedness. 2  The plaintiff then sued the officer for securi-
ties fraud and the bank for aiding and abetting the officer. 24
The Woodward court constructed a method of analysis that has
proven influential:
When it is impossible to find any duty of disclosure, an alleged
aider-abettor should be found liable only if scienter of the high
"conscious intent" variety can be proved. Where some special
duty of disclosure exists, then liability should be possible with a
lesser degree of scienter or knowledge. In a case combining si-
lence/inaction with affirmative assistance, the degree of knowl-
edge required should depend on how ordinary the assisting
activity is in the business involved.
12
Applying these standards to the facts, the Woodward court found that
the defendant bank's actions neither constituted substantial assistance
nor demonstrated the requisite intent to participate in the primary ac-
tor's section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 violations. 126 The court recognized as
key to its decision the fact that the bank owed no special duties to the
plaintiff and that the lower court had concluded that the transaction was
ordinary in nature.' 27 Thus, the court held that the plaintiff did not
prove her claim for Rule lOb-5 relief under an aiding and abetting
theory. 128
The flexible analysis, as introduced by Woodward, recognizes the
relationship between standards of proof and the types of proof necessary
to fulfill those standards. The subsections below demonstrate how the
courts have relied on certain factors to infer the knowledge and assist-
ance elements of aiding and abetting liability.
1. Inference of culpable conduct from the surrounding circumstances
In Woodward, the court's affirmation that knowledge may be in-
ferred depending on the type of transaction, has been followed and ex-
panded by other courts.' 29  Generally, two methods have become
122. Id.
123. Id. at 88-89.
124. Id. at 89.
125. Id. at 97 (citations omitted).
126. Id. at 100.
127. Id. at 98, 100.
128. Id. at 98.
129. See infra notes 146-55 and accompanying text.
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significant in circumstantially proving the scienter or knowledge require-
ment on the part of the aider-abettor. Courts have been willing to infer a
culpable state of mind when the defendant has both substantially assisted
in the fraudulent scheme and either (1) stood to gain personally from the
fraudulent method or transaction;1 30 or (2) engaged in a transaction that
was "atypical" or lacked business justification that should have made the
defendant suspicious of possible wrongdoing.
131
a inference of scienter or knowledge through the aider-abettor's
securing of a benefit from the fraudulent transaction
In Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co., 1 32 the Third Circuit
stated that the "requirement of knowledge may be less strict where the
alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from the wrongdoing." 
13 3 If
the plaintiff is unable to present direct evidence of scienter or knowledge,
the court may infer the requisite culpable standard through the defend-
ant's economic motivation to benefit himself or herself by assisting in the
fraud or cover-up. To ascertain this, the court should ask whether the
aider-abettor gained by participating in the bilking of the buyers of the
securities. 134
For example, the Eighth Circuit in Metge v. Baehler,1 35 found aiding
and abetting liability against a bank that had financed a corporation orig-
inally involved in the business of buying, selling and servicing real estate
contracts on low-cost homes. 136 When the corporation experienced fi-
nancial difficulty, the defendant bank had engaged in strategies to keep
the corporation afloat. 137 The bank, although taking a substantial loss,
was able to prolong the corporation's financial viability and cut its losses
by receiving significant payments of principal, interest, and service
charges at the expense of those who held the corporation's thrift securi-
130. See, e.g., Barker, 797 F.2d at 497; IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909,
927 (2d Cir. 1980); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Martin v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 639 F. Supp. 931 (D. Md.
1986).
131. See, e.g., Woods, 765 F.2d at 1012; Brennan, 417 F.2d 147; In re Gas Reclamation,
Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Goldman v. McMahan, Brafmian, Morgan
& Co., Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 93,354, at 96,810-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Ruder, The Private
Action Against Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor: Silent and Inactive Conduct, 29 VAND. L.
REv. 1233 (1976).
132. 535 F.2d 761 (3d Cir. 1976).
133. Id. at 780; see also Monsen, 579 F.2d at 799.
134. Barker, 797 F.2d at 497.
135. 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986).
136. Id. at 623.
137. Id.
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ties. 13  In determining whether the aider-abettor bank had knowledge of
the fraudulent scheme, the court found significant the fact that the aider-
abettor had benefitted from the scheme.1 39 The court held that:
[There is an] inference arising from the evidence which suggests
that, although [the aider-abettor] made no profits on its loans to
[the corporation] nor even recovered its outstanding funds by
postponing [the corporation's] demise, it may have been able to
lever itself into a more favorable position than the holders of
thrift certificates. 140
In lIT v. Cornfeld,14 1 the Second Circuit in an opinion by Judge
Friendly, considered an appeal from a dismissal of a complaint against an
alleged aider-abettor.1 42 Like the Third Circuit, Judge Friendly thought
it critical that the "plaintiffs [did] not allege that [the alleged aider-abet-
tor] intended by its silence to forward completion of the fraudulent trans-
actions in the expectation of benefitting from the success of the fraud." 
143
The court upheld the dismissal."4
The above cases demonstrate that the existence of an economic mo-
tive is an accepted way to show that the ader-abettor has thrown in his
or her lot with the primary violator,14 and usable as proof to substanti-
ate the inference that the aider-abettor had the requisite scienter or
knowledge to justify liability.
b. inference of scienter or knowledge when transaction is atypical and
without business justification
In Woods v. Barnett Bank,146 the Eleventh Circuit held a bank liable
138. Id. at 629-30.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 630.
141. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
142. Id. at 927.
143. Id. In Brennan, 417 F.2d at 154-55, the court imposed liability on an issuer for not
exposing a securities dealer's fraudulent activity that had increased the value of the issuer's
shares. The aider-abettor had an incentive to conceal the information of the fraud, for it would
benefit the aider-abettor's negotiations with a potential merger partner. Id. at 153. The court
recognized that a motivation toward non-disclosure will establish the requisite culpability,
with the required level of affirmative assistance reduced. Id.; see also, SEC v. Washington
County Util. Dist., 676 F.2d 218, 227 (6th Cir. 1982) (Sixth Circuit inferred culpable state of
mind where the alleged aider-abettor sought to benefit from continued cover-up of kickback
scheme. The court emphasized that the aider-abettor "knew that the payments he received
would continue only as long as he assisted in the passage of the authorizing resolutions.").
144. IT, 619 F.2d at 927.
145. Id. (aiders and abettors should "associate themselves with the venture or participate in
it as something they wish to bring about").
146. 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985).
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for aiding and abetting a securities fraud.14 7 One of the bank's loan of-
ficers sent a reassuring letter of recommendation to a second bank for
one of the aider-abettor's clients, the primary violator, facilitating the
fraudulent underwriting of a bond issue.14 The Woods court supported
its finding of. scienter by recognizing that the issuance of a letter "con-
taining statements of which the writer has no knowledge, without even
minimal investigation to determine whether its contents are accurate,
solely for the purpose of 'currying favor' with a good client, can hardly
be regarded as 'the daily grist of the mill.' """4 The court found that the
behavior was both "suspicious" and "atypical" in the banking
business.1 50
Additionally, district courts have been denying motions to dismiss,
identifying allegations of atypical transactions and business conduct as
sufficient to support inferences of scienter or knowledge. i 15  For example,
in In re Gas Reclamation, Inc., Securities Litigation,52 the district court,
in upholding the sufficiency of a complaint, recognized that "one might
reasonably infer knowledge and intent from the allegations of substantial
assistance .... Such allegations include, among others, participation in
atypical financing transactions."'1
5 3
Courts also look to the nature of the security to determine whether
the transaction was atypical. The type of security reveals much about
the circumstances in which the transaction is consummated. One court
has succinctly set forth this concept:
If the securities involved are shares of common stock and some-
one aids and abets a fraud perpetrated in their sale, the culprit
would be hard pressed to argue innocence once his awareness of
the general sales activity was shown. On the other hand, if the
document is barely a security at all, like a loan, then other in-
dependent commercial assumptions come into play, and the al-
147. Id. at 1011-12.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1012; see Frankel v. Wyllie & Thornhill, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 730, 744 (W.D. Va.
1982) (court held scienter may be inferred when the aider-abettor holds himself out as an
expert in the field, receives compensation for services and where the transaction is not in "daily
grist of the mill"); see also Washington County UtiL Dist, 676 F.2d at 226 ("if the alleged aider
and abettor conducts a transaction of an extraordinary nature, less evidence of his complicity
is necessary"); Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541
(9th Cir. 1984).
150. Woods, 765 F.2d at 1012.
151. See, eg., Goldman, Fed. Sec. L. Rep., (CCH) 93,354, at 96,811. See generally In re
Gas Reclamation, Inc. Sec. Litig., 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
152. 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
153. Id. at 503-04.
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leged aider-abettor may be unaware of any improper activity."5 4
Using a sliding-scale analysis to determine the necessary level of sci-
enter or knowledge exemplifies how the courts have recognized the need
for flexibility in determining aiding and abetting liability."' Factors
such as the type of transactions-atypical or in the ordinary course of
business-allow courts the flexibility to balance the expectations of the
parties based on the surrounding circumstances, while taking into con-
sideration the need for vigorous securities markets. However, other fac-
tors also play a role in affecting the expectations of the parties.
2. Duty and the level of scienter or knowledge required
Of the factors considered in determining aiding and abetting liabil-
ity, courts most often ground the flexible analysis in the presence of a
duty owed by the alleged aider-abettor to the investor.1 5 6 However, most
courts have limited the scope of a sliding-scale approach to situations
where the aider-abettor assisted only through inaction or silence, varying
the required level of scienter or knowledge depending upon the existence
of a duty. 57 These courts have generally held that absent a duty to dis-
close, the plaintiff must show that the aider-abettor had a higher degree
of knowledge, than if a duty were present.158
154. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95.
155. See supra notes 113-68 and accompanying text.
156. See, eg., Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983); 1IT, 619 F.2d at 927;
Woodward, 522 F.2d at 97.
157. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. Contra IT, 619 F.2d at 923; Rolf v. Blyth,
Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978).
The true significance of this limitation has to be questioned. For an aider-abettor to be
liable, he or she must have either committed some affirmative act of assistance or deliberately
failed to disclose his knowledge of the fraud. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text. In
Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057 (1986), the Eighth
Circuit recognized that the "distinction between positive action and deliberate inaction is elu-
sive." Id. at 624. In the case of affirmative participation, it is much easier to prove knowledge
and assistance. However, as for inaction, the aider-abettor's intent, knowledge and assistance
generally must be inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the reasoning of Harm-
sen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1982), that a duty arises from "knowing assistance of or
participation in a fraudulent scheme," Id. at 944, is followed-both those who have acted
affirmatively and passively would have breached a duty to the investor, and thus are equally
culpable. However, when there is just inaction and nothing more, the special treatment is
justified. Some type of proof showing that the alleged aider-abettor is culpable is required, so
as not to find innocent participants liable. Where silence is coupled with affirmative assistance,
the degree of knowledge required will depend upon how ordinary the transaction is in the
business involved. See Woodward, 522 F.2d at 96-97. See supra notes 116-68 and accompany-
ing text for arguments why other factors should affect the level of scienter or knowledge and
assistance required for aiding and abetting liability.
158. See, eg., Armstrong, 699 F.2d at 91 (where no duty is present, "the 'scienter' require-
ment scales upward"); Sirota v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 673 F,2d 566, 575 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
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Some courts have followed a strict view when a duty is lacking.
These courts require that the scienter requirement "must, in fact, ap-
proximate an actual intent to aid in the fraud being perpetrated."1" 9
Other courts have been more flexible, requiring that where there is no
fiduciary relationship, "an alleged aider-abettor should be found liable
only if scienter of the high 'conscious intent' variety can be proved."' 6
Other courts allow that even in the absence of a fiduciary duty, a lower
standard of scienter or knowledge may be applied depending on the cir-
cumstances of the particular case.
1 6 1
Courts that permit a lesser degree of scienter or knowledge to estab-
lish liability reason that the presence of a duty reflects the expectations of
the parties; when a duty is present the investor expects a higher degree of
good faith in the relationship. 62 Conversely, without substantial knowl-
nied, 459 U.S. 838 (1982); Edwards & Hanly v. Wells Fargo Sec. Clearance Corp., 602 F.2d
478, 485 (2d Cir.) (to find aider-abettor liable under 10b-5 absent fiduciary duty, something
closer to actual intent to aid in fraud required), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1045 (1979); Woodward,
522 F.2d at 97 ("When it is impossible to find a duty to disclose, an alleged aider-abettor
should be found liable only if scienter of the high 'conscious intent' variety can be proved.");
see also SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); Washington County UtiL Dist., 676
F.2d at 226; Monsen, 579 F.2d at 800; cf. Cleary, 700 F.2d at 777 ("Where the defendant has a
duty to disclose the primary violations, however, courts have been willing to impose liability
on the basis of a recklessness standard, or on a lesser showing of actual awareness than is
otherwise required." (citations omitted)). Contra Barker, 797 F.2d at 496-97 (absent duty to
speak concerning knowledge of ongoing fraud, silence even if morally culpable, does not have
legal consequences under securities laws); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d
928, 932-33 (7th Cir.) ("When the problem consists in keeping silent while the primary viola-
tor carries out the fraud, the plaintiff must show that the silent person had a legal duty to
speak."), cert. denied, 109 S.Ct. 311 (1988).
159. Decker v. Massey-Ferguson, Ltd., 681 F.2d 111, 121 (2d Cir. 1982).
160. IIT, 619 F.2d at 925 (quoting Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 97 (5th Cir.
1975)). See Edwards & Hanly, 602 F.2d at 485 ("Finding a person liable for aiding and abet-
ting... requires something closer to an actual intent to aid in a fraud, at least in the absence of
some special relationship with the plaintiff that is fiduciary in nature."). Similarly, other
courts have required that where there is no duty to disclose, the plaintiff must prove the silence
of the accused aider-abettor "was consciously intended to aid the securities law violation," and
"must prove either a culpable state of mind or conduct from which a culpable state of mind
may be inferred." Washington County UtiL Dist., 676 F.2d at 226; see also Moore v. Fenex,
Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 304 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 107 S. Ct. 3231 (1987); Meige, 762 F.2d at 625.
161. In Frankel, 537 F. Supp. at 744, the district court acknowledged prior case law requir-
ing a "high conscious intent" standard of scienter for liability in cases where inaction is plead
in the absence of a duty. However, the court took a flexible approach to its analysis and looked
to several factors in deciding to require a lower level of scienter. Id. The court relied upon
factors such as the aider-abettors holding themselves out as experts and receiving compensa-
tion for services that were not in the "daily grist of the mill." Id. Further, the existence or
nonexistence of a duty on behalf of the aider-abettor relates only to the degree of scienter or
knowledge required to find liability. See, e.g., Sirota, 673 F.2d 566, 575; lIT, 619 F.2d at 923,
927; Monsen, 579 F.2d at 800.
162. See Rolf, 570 F.2d at 44-45; Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95.
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edge and assistance, aiding and abetting liability is unsuitable when the
relationship between the plaintiff and defendant is "remote."
163
Further recognizing the importance of the parties' expectations
springing from their relationship, district courts are increasingly apply-
ing a lower threshold of scienter or knowledge where it was foreseeable
that the plaintiff would have relied upon the defendant's representations
or lack thereof. 6' These courts have applied a lower standard of culpa-
bility to "alleged aiders and abettors who have issued statements or certi-
fications foreseeably relied upon by investors, reasoning that a duty to
disclose arises under such circumstances."165
Courts have relied on the existence of a benefit to the aider-abetter,
the character of the transaction and the presence of a duty as factors that
imply culpable conduct. However, the interrelationship between the
knowledge and assistance elements has also been considered a factor in a
flexible analysis.
3. Relation between knowledge and assistance
Finally, some courts have taken the view that each of the elements
are not to be viewed in isolation. 166 The Fifth Circuit has stated: "The
scienter requirement scales upward when the activity is more remote;
therefore, the assistance rendered should be both substantial and know-
ing."16 7 Conversely, when there is a limited demonstration of substantial
163. See, e.g., Monsen, 579 F.2d at 800; Rojf, 570 F.2d at 44-45; cf. Woodward, 522 F.2d at
95 (where there is lack of fiduciary duty "the scienter requirement scales upward when the
activity is more remote, therefore, the assistance rendered should be both substantial and
knowing").
164. See, e.g., In re Investors Funding Corp., 523 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Oleck v.
Fischer, Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) % 96,898, at 95,680 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 1979), aff'd on other
grounds, 623 F.2d 791 (2d Cir. 1980).
165. Woods, 765 F.2d at 1011-12 (citing Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
545 F. Supp. 1314, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Morgan v. Prudential Group, Inc., 527 F. Supp.
957, 960-61 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd without opinion, 729 F.2d 1443 (2d Cir. 1983); see also I1T,
619 F.2d at 927 ("Accountants do have a duty to take reasonable steps to correct misstate-
ments they have discovered in previous financial statements on which they know the public is
relying."); cf. United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.) (recognizing that one may not
shut one's eyes to what is plainly to be seen, when one is charged with the specific responsibil-
ity of a competent professional audit), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
166. See, e.g., IT, 619 F.2d at 922 ("Moreover, the three requirements cannot be consid-
ered in isolation from one another."); Metge, 762 F.2d at 624 ("The factors-particularly the
second and third-are not to be considered in isolation, but should be considered relative to
one another... [t]he two factors vary inversely relative to one another .... "); Johnson v.
Chilcott, 658 F. Supp. 1213, 1222 (D. Colo. 1987) ("The last two elements of aiding and
abetting liability cannot be viewed in a vacuum but must be considered together.").
167. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 95 (emphasis added).
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assistance, a greater showing of scienter or knowledge is required.1 68
The courts' assertion of such a flexible analysis adds substance to the
bare elements of the three-part test. By providing factors by which the
court may determine liability, participants in the securities industry can
tailor their transactions to avoid aiding and abetting liability. At the
same time, judges have the flexibility to weigh all the circumstances in
the case to fairly determine liability. However, to be effective the gui-
dance must be realistic and consistent. The remaining sections of this
Comment propose an analytical model to determine aiding and abetting
liability that seeks to be practical and useful.
VI. MODEL FOR A SLIDING-SCALE, FLEXIBLE-FACTOR ANALYSIS
The inability of the courts of appeals to render clear guidance as to
the level of knowledge and assistance required and to the type of proof
necessary to find aiding and abetting liability has left this area of the law
unpredictable. Participants in the securities industry lack a clear stan-
dard from which to conform their behavior in transactions. In addition,
the courts have not demonstrated sufficient flexibility in their analyses to
halt the ever-increasing ingenuity of the securities violator in an area of
the law where a myriad of complex fact situations arise. The remaining
sections of this Comment advocate the infusion of a sliding-scale, flexi-
ble-factor analysis into the courts' existing three-part test. This proposed
analysis incorporates the circuits' several flexible analyses into a single
sliding-scale, flexible-factor model. The result is a consistent and coher-
ent way to address aiding and abetting cases.
A. Source of the Sliding-Scale, Flexible-Factor Analysis
The source of the sliding-scale, flexible-factor analysis is White v.
Abrams,16 9 a case involving a securities violation by a primary party.
While the actual content of the White analysis arguably has little signifi-
cance in the aiding and abetting context,17 ° the Ninth Circuit's analytical
168. Id.; see Metge, 762 F.2d at 624.
169. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
170. In White, all the factors focused "upon the relationship between the plaintiff and the
defendant, leading to the conjecture that the court did not intend to deal with situations where
there is no relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant, but where the defendant, none-
theless materially and substantially contributes to the wrong done." In re Gap Stores Sec.
Litig., 457 F. Supp. 1135, 1144 (N.D. Cal. 1978). Another district court has stated:
[a] distinction [exists] between a duty to disclose under the White v. Abrams test and
the duty to disclose that pertains to aider and abettor liability. The primary viola-
tor's duty to disclose arises from his involvement with the entity whose securities are
at issue and his relationship to the plaintiffs. The secondary violator's duty arises
from 'knowing assistance of or participation in a fraudulent scheme.'
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model assists in formulating a flexible-factor analysis that determines the
required level of knowledge and assistance based on certain factors rele-
vant to the aiding and abetting context.
71
In White, the Ninth Circuit sought to eliminate reliance on the sci-
enter element in Rule lOb-5 securities fraud cases and advanced a new
mode of securities analysis. 172 In the court's analysis, a sliding-scale of
factors, inchoate in earlier decisions, determined whether a high or low
standard would be required of the primary violator to find liability.'17
The standard of culpability shifted depending on the factual circum-
stances and helped determine the extent to which certain distinct duties
may arise. 74 These duties included an affirmative duty to disclose, a
duty not to misrepresent, and a duty to investigate and to disclose based
on that investigation.1 75 The court attempted to avoid a set standard of
culpability. It set out its factors without a formula for weighing those
factors and, without establishing precise limits, gave examples of how the
duty to disclose or investigate might fluctuate depending upon the cir-
cumstances.1 76 The White court stated:
Where the defendant derives great benefit from a relation-
ship of extreme trust... [and] the defendant know[s] that [the]
plaintiff completely relies upon him for information to which he
has ready access, but to which the plaintiff has no access, the
law imposes a duty upon the defendant to use extreme care in
assuring that all material information is accurate and dis-
closed .... On the other hand, where the defendant's relation-
Wright v. Schock, 571 F. Supp. 642, 663 (N.D. Cal. 1983), aff'd, 742 F.2d 541 (9th Cir. 1984)
(citing Harmsen v. Smith, 693 F.2d 932, 944 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 822
(1983)). "This distinction may be more semantic than real, however, where the involvement of
the defendant in the securities transactions at issue is minimal." Mirotznick v. Sensney, Davis
& McCormick, 658 F. Supp. 932, 941 (W.D. Wash. 1986).
171. According to courts that have interpreted White's flexible duty analysis, "the closer
the relationship of the person charged to the corporation and the greater his participation in
the transaction attacked, the easier it will be to prove the requisite scienter." Robinson v.
Heilman, 563 F.2d 1304, 1308 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam).
172. Id. at 734-36. The continued reliance on White has been questioned since Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). However, the mode of analysis is a valuable way to
balance the need for predictability and flexibility. See Branson, Statutory Securities Fraud in
the Post-Hochfelder Era: The Continued Viability of Modes of Flexible Analysis, 52 TUL. L.
REv. 50, 53-64 (1977).
173. White, 495 F.2d at 734-36.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 736. The sliding-scale factors included the nature of the parties relationship, the
degree of trust plaintiff had placed in defendant's guidance or expertise, the benefit defendant
received from the relationship and defendant's access to relevant investment information in
comparison to plaintiff's access. Id. at 735-36.
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ship with the plaintiff is so casual that a reasonably prudent
person would not rely upon it in making investment decisions,
the defendant's only duty is not to misrepresent intentionally
material facts.
177
The White analysis provides the basic model which can be altered to
apply to the aiding and abetting context. This mode of analysis has the
advantage of weighing the facts and circumstances of each case in deter-
mining the level of scienter or knowledge and assistance required for lia-
bility. Moreover, it allows courts to balance the conflicting concerns for
the protection of the investor and the need for robust securities markets.
B. The Sliding-Scale, Flexible-Factor Analysis
The difficulty the courts have had in drawing clear conclusions in
the aider-abettor area demonstrates that a straightforward and consistent
analysis should be developed to give direction to the courts in determin-
ing liability. The proposed model is not to dispose of the existing three-
part test, but merely to be incorporated within it. It permits the principle
variables, 171 of knowledge and assistance to fluctuate in various grada-
tions.' 79 This proposal only recommends certain factors for courts to
177. Id. at 736.
178. See Branson, supra note 172, at 90.
179. There are several legally identifiable degrees to which the knowledge variable may be
viable. Professors Ruder and Cross suggest the following categories:
1. Deliberate conduct exists when the defendant has an intent to injure others.
2. Knowing conduct exists when the defendant acts with the knowledge that
his acts may injure others. Knowing conduct would include knowing misrepresenta-
tion or nondisclosure.
3. Reckless conduct exists when the defendant acts in conscious disregard of,
or indifference to, the risk that others will be misled. This conduct includes what is
sometimes referred to as "gross negligence."
4. Negligent conduct exists when the defendant acts unreasonably but does not
act with conscious disregard of consequences.
5. Innocent conduct exists when the defendant cannot reasonably be expected
to know the true facts.
Ruder & Cross, Limitations on Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5, DuKE L.J. 1125, 1140 (1972)
(footnote omitted).
Notwithstanding the above delineations of degrees of culpability, the term reckless or
gross negligence may still be broken down to even smaller increments of degrees.
[Tihe secondary wrongdoer may have been only grossly negligent [or reckless] but in
the egregious sense of having been consciously indifferent to the suspected nature of
the primary wrongdoer's acts; or the aider and abettor may, through lack of even the
slightest care, have failed to become aware of the primary wrongdoer's illegal course
of conduct. An act of the last kind might be called gross negligence in the lesser
sense.
Branson, supra note 172, at 90 (footnote omitted).
While it is clear that since Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), negligence
will not suffice to establish liability, the plaintiff must prove scienter. Scienter has been charac-
terized by the United States Supreme Court as a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
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consider and demonstrates how these factors may affect the required
level of culpability and assistance. It does not endeavor to set precise
parameters since the courts require flexibility as to which levels of knowl-
edge and assistance the circumstances of each particular case shall com-
pel. However, the use of factors which the courts and participants in the
industry may rely upon will provide the guidance necessary to ensure
predictability in establishing aiding and abetting liability under the three-
part test.
1. Proposed model for the sliding-scale, flexible-factor analysis
A court analyzing an aiding and abetting case should look to the
following factors once a primary violation has been established: (1) the
existence of the aider-abettor's knowledge of the violation and role in the
fraudulent scheme; (2) the type and degree of participation or assistance;
(3) the type of relationship among the parties and whether the relation-
ship resulted in the plaintiff reasonably relying upon the representations
or omissions of the aider-abettor; (4) the existence and type of economic
benefit derived from the relationship by the aider-abettor; and (5) the
nature of the security that is the object of the transaction.1 80 The key to
this analysis is to give substance to the well-established existing three-
part test. This analysis does not set out a fixed level of scienter or knowl-
edge to be applied; 18' it attempts to give guidance in how varying stan-
dards of scienter or knowledge and participation interrelate with varying
factors to exhibit proof of knowledge and assistance.
manipulate, or defraud. Id. at 193-99. However, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder reserved
decision on the issue of whether recklessness or gross negligence will satisfy the scienter re-
quirement. See supra note 69. Thus, the above recital of various levels of culpability, except
for negligent and innocent conduct, are all within the minimum level of scienter the Court may
allow and, therefore, the lower courts are free to apply these standards.
180. See supra notes 20 and 23 and accompanying text.
181. The meaning of scienter is the subject of several very comprehensive comments, and is
beyond the scope of this Comment. See, e.g., Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Define
Scienter Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REV. 213 (1977); Fis-
chel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Act of 1934, 69 CALIF. L. REV.
80 (1981); Gilmore & McBride, Liability of Financial Institutions for Aiding and Abetting Vio-
lations of Securities Laws, 42 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 811 (1985); Sachs, The Relevance of Tort
Law Doctrines To Rule 10b-5: Should Careless Plaintiffs be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L.
REV. 96 (1985); Steinberg & Gruenbaum, Variations of "Recklessness" after Hochfelder and
Aaron, 8 Snc. REG. L.J. 179 (1980); Note, Liability for Aiding and Abetting Violations of Rule
10b-5: The Recklessness Standard in Civil Damage Actions, 62 TEx. L. REv. 1087 (1984);
Note, Recklessness and the Rule 10b-5 Scienter Standard after Hochfelder, 48 FORDHAM L.
REV. 817 (1980); Note, Reckless Conduct: The Securities Fraud Aider and Abettor as a Con-
current Tortfeasor, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1391 (1979); Comment, The Recognition ofAiding
and Abetting in the Federal Securities Laws, 23 Hous. L. REv. 821 (1986).
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2. Applications of the sliding-scale, flexible-factor analysis
In determining aiding and abetting liability, courts should concur-
rently weigh the evidence of knowledge and the evidence of assistance.' 8 2
Where the court finds a high level of knowledge, then a lesser degree of
assistance should be required. For instance, if the proof shows that the
aider-abettor deliberately participated in the furtherance of a fraudulent
scheme, then the assistance prong should be satisfied by less than actual
participation. However, if there is proof only that the alleged aider-abet-
tor was merely reckless in not detecting his or her participation in the
fraudulent scheme, a higher degree of actual assistance would be
necessary.
It is important to keep in mind that knowledge is the key to aiding
and abetting liability. 183 Proof of some degree of knowledge of the
wrongdoing is necessary to differentiate between innocent, ordinary-
course-of-business transactions and transactions that are tainted with in-
dicia of fraud.184 Without a minimum degree of knowledge, "banks, bro-
kers, clearing agents, transfer agents and other such participants in the
process could become virtual insurers of their customers against securi-
ties law violations."' 85 Thus, courts should be cautious when reducing
the degree of knowledge necessary for liability when a high level of assist-
ance is present. If there is a high degree of assistance, a substantial re-
duction in the amount of knowledge required may have grave effects.
However, the level and type of assistance may be a strong indication of
the aider-abettor's knowledge; therefore, the courts should not overlook
assistance itself as a factor in determining the proper requisite level of
knowledge.'
86
Courts should also recognize that a greater degree of knowledge is
required to satisfy the scienter requirement when the alleged aider-abet-
tor's activity is more remote. Remoteness is mainly a function of the
relationship between the plaintiff and the aider-abettor.'8 7 The expecta-
tions for good faith and fair dealing of the parties decrease the more re-
mote the aider-abettor's participation is from the primary violation.
Thus, when the transaction creates a relationship in which the law im-
182. Depending upon the degree and type of knowledge and assistance, the court should
vary the standard of culpability and the level of assistance necessary to impose aiding and
abetting liability.
183. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
184. Ferrara & Sanger, supra note 36, at 115.
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 97-104 and accompanying text.
187. See Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975). See supra notes 162-63
and accompanying text.
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poses a duty on the aider-abettor to the investor, the degree of scienter or
knowledge required should decrease.1
88
Inherent in a fiduciary relationship is the understanding that a per-
son having the duty is to act primarily on behalf of the one to whom the
duty is owed in matters connected with the relationship.18 9 Thus, the
existence of a duty symbolizes an expectation of good faith and fair deal-
ing.190 Accordingly, the standard of culpability should vary depending
upon the relationship and the expectation of the parties. For example, if
an independent fiduciary relationship is created, such as that existing be-
tween a broker and client,191 then the court would demand a lower level
of scienter or knowledge. However, if the relationship does not create a
duty, a higher level of scienter or knowledge would be required to estab-
lish liability on the part of the aider-abettor.
Further, if a relationship of trust results in the plaintiff reasonably
relying upon the defendant's representations or lack thereof, a lower de-
gree of scienter or knowledge should also be sufficient to find liability.
Foreseeable reliance on those who play important roles in the securities
markets is another factor that justifies a lower standard of scienter or
knowledge in order to ensure a minimum standard of due care in their
representations.1 92 In this situation, the court may either impose an in-
dependent duty to disclose or act or allow a lower standard of scienter or
knowledge as sufficient for liability.1 93
If the transaction does not create a duty to disclose or act, then the
court should look to other factors that may affect the expectations of the
parties, such as the type of transaction. 194 If the transaction is in the
ordinary course of business, more evidence of complicity would be re-
quired. However, if the transaction was extraordinary or atypical in na-
ture, a lower standard of culpability would be necessary.
The type of defendant participation is a factor that should also be
188. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. Some courts have imposed a duty of disclo-
sure for knowingly participating in a fraudulent scheme, without the requirement of a relation-
ship of trust and confldence. See, ag., Strong v. France, 474 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1973).
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
189. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 320 (5th ed. 1979). A fiduciary relationship arises out of a
relationship of trust and confidences between the parties to the transactions. See Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230 (1980).
190. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 75.
192. See Mishkin v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 658 F. Supp. 271, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(accounting firm may be held liable as an aider and abettor in a securities fraud case for "reck-
lessly" performing an audit). See also supra notes 164-65 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 23-34 and 156-59 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 23-34 and 146-55 and accompanying text.
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evaluated in conjunction with other factors of the analysis. If the defend-
ant's participation includes affirmative acts, then a lesser degree of
knowledge would be required, depending upon the amount of assistance
and other factors that show proof of such knowledge. 9 ' A lower level of
knowledge is appropriate in these situations, because even at low levels
the culpable conduct must show that the aider-abettor consciously disre-
garded the interests of others or lacked the slightest care, which in itself
shows a form of knowledge. 196 These secondary defendants tend to be
the brokers, bankers, accountants, lawyers and other participants in the
securities markets who perform an important role in maintaining inves-
tor confidence and protection.' 97 Thus, allowing a lesser degree of
knowledge, such as gross negligence or recklessness, would establish a
minimum level of diligence by these important participants, consistent
with the goal of protecting the investor.' 98
If the defendant's participation is less direct, say, inaction or silence,
then a higher degree of knowledge should be required. This guarantees
that innocent and remote participants are not left insuring the wrongful
actions of others. The lack of action on the part of the alleged aider-
abettor creates problems for courts, for they generally have to infer the
knowledge and assistance elements. Thus, the courts have required
something more than mere silence, inaction or both.' 99
While it may be desirable to hold every participant to a transaction
who has knowledge that some form of fraudulent scheme is underway
liable for failure to act or disclose," "Rule lOb-5 was not designed to be
195. See supra notes 76-104, 132-55 and 166-68 and accompanying text. The thrust of this
proposal is that except in cases where the alleged aider-abettor owes no duty to the investor
and was silent or failed to act, a degree of culpability less than "conscious intent" should
apply. The use of this analysis is to determine in what situations and at what level certain
lower levels of culpability should be required.
196. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text and supra note 182.
197. See supra notes 23-34 and accompanying text. See also Felts v. National Account Sys.
Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (recognizing that attorney of issuer plays a
"unique and pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities laws").
198. See Note, Establishment of Liability for Aiding and Abetting Fraud Under Rule 10b-5
and the Common Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 862, 883-84 (1978). It is very difficult for a plaintiff
to prove that an aider-abettor had actual knowledge of a fraudulent scheme. See, eg., G. A.
Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961 n.32 (5th Cir. 1981) ("It is usually difficult
for the plaintiff to prove more than that the defendant must have known about the misrepre-
sentation or omission and its potential harm. Such [a] showing would prove recklessness, but
is usually insufficient to prove specific intent."). This problem of proof creates difficulty of
accountability for those upon whom the investors essentially rely.
199. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
200. The Supreme Court has established that absent a duty in the primary violation con-
text, there is no liability for the failure to disclose the existence of a fraudulent scheme. See
supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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the ethical Ten Commandments for all securities transactions. ' '20  There
needs to be a balance between the absolute protection of the investor and
unconditional laissez faire.20 2 There should be some showing that the
defendant sought the outcome of the fraudulent scheme. Thus, if there is
proof that the defendant's silence is influenced by an economic motive
beyond ordinary fees or commissions,2 3 then a lesser degree of knowl-
edge and assistance would be required.2" The existence of an independ-
ent duty owed to the investor by the aider-abettor, however, creates a
different situation in which a higher expectation of good faith and fair
dealing exists.20 ' Therefore, an independent duty should create liability
based on a lower degree of knowledge and assistance than that which
would be required absent such a duty.
VI. CONCLUSION
In recent years the importance of aiding and abetting liability for
fraudulent securities transactions has grown. Unfortunately, the
Supreme Court of the United States has not provided guidance in the
development of a clear cause of action. The lower federal courts, though,
have agreed on a three-part test to determine aiding and abetting liabil-
ity; however, they differ sharply on the interrelationship among the parts.
As a result of the disagreement over the operation of the test, this
area of the securities laws lacks the predictability, flexibility and safe-
guards necessary to combat the wide variety of securities fraud. This
201. Woodward, 522 F.2d at 91.
202. Laissez faire is alternatively defined as "the theory or system of government that up-
holds the autonomous character of the economic order, believing that government should in-
tervene as little as possible in the direction of economic affairs .... [or as t]he practice or
doctrine of noninterference in the affairs of others, esp[ecially] with reference to individual
conduct or freedom of action." RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1076 (2d ed. 1987).
203. For an example of how an economic motive may effect a court's reasoning in finding
liability for inaction and silence see Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793,
802-03 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (Third Circuit held bank substantially as-
sisted in Rule lob-5 violation through inaction and silence, where court focused on fact that
bank's motive was based upon self interest in encouraging clients to borrow from client's em-
ployees on subordinated basis while bank's loans were secured).
204. See supra note 132-45 and accompanying text. If a defendant were to be liable merely
for pursuing his livelihood, then such a standard would be a trap for guilty and innocent alike.
The business reality of such a standard would essentially force all parties involved in the trans-
action to implement expensive mechanisms to protect against such a result. Thus, the benefits
of protecting the investor would be overshadowed by the costs of complying with the standard.
Such a result cannot be what Rule lob-5 was intended to produce.
205. See supra note 189-93 and accompanying text.
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Comment proposes to remedy these problems by infusing a balance of
predictability and flexibility into the existing analytical framework.
The courts should incorporate a sliding-scale, flexible-factor analysis
into the existing test. Factors such as whether the defendant's conduct
was affirmative or passive, whether the defendant owed the plaintiff a
fiduciary duty, the nature of the security and other considerations should
all be evaluated in determining the appropriate levels of knowledge and
assistance-the second and third elements of the test-necessary for
liability.
The result of applying the sliding-scale, flexible-factor model may be
in fringe cases less predictable than when applying a rigid test. Yet, this
loss of predictability will only affect the person whose acts border on
illegality, a region where predictions are usually futile. Most impor-
tantly, the sliding-scale, flexible-factor model serves the two equally im-
portant but somewhat conflicting policy considerations of protecting the
investor and insuring a robust securities market. The model advances
the goal of investor protection without taking the savvy out of the securi-
ties markets at a time when investor confidence is waning and securities
frauds are becoming more complex.
Jeffrey Farley Keller*
* I wish to dedicate this article to my father, Jerry Keller. I know he would be proud. I
further wish to thank Kathryn W. Tate for her valuable guidance and feedback throughout the
preparation of this Comment.
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